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Kathleen	E.	A.	Monteith,	Depression	to	Decolonization:	Barclays	Bank	(DCO)	in	the	
West	Indies,	1926‐1962	
Kathleen	Monteith’s	study	of	Barclays	Bank	DCO	in	the	West	Indies	is	a	useful	addition	to	
the	puzzle	of	the	history	of	international	business	in	developing	countries.	While	there	
has	been	some	significant	historical	research	on	international	banking,	especially	
Geoffrey	Jones’	British	Multinational	Banking	(1993),	to	which	Monteith	frequently	refers,	
such	long‐range	industry‐wide	studies	necessarily	focus	on	overall	corporate	strategy	and	
the	organisational	focus	on	the	economically	most	promising	territories.	Hence	detailed	
information	to	compare	industry	and	business	conditions	in	the	less	developed	countries	
of	the	Caribbean,	Latin	America,	Africa	and	Asia	is	still	not	easily	available.	Did	
multinationals	follow	similar	or	locally	specific	policies	in	these	commercially	less	
interesting	territories,	did	they	transfer	knowledge,	staff,	capital	between	these	areas?	In	
that	respect	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	strategies	of	one	of	Britain’s	foremost	international	
banks	in	such	an	important	region	of	the	world	is	of	great	interest.	
Yet	as	a	book,	this	study	is	unclear	in	its	focus:	is	it	the	strategies	of	the	firm	or	the	impact	
of	the	bank	on	the	territory	in	which	it	operates	that	are	being	investigated?	These	two	
are	not	necessarily	mutually	exclusive,	but	require	a	clear	conceptual	framework.	
Considering	that	in	the	time	period	investigated	it	was	the	competition	from	Canadian	
banks	that	was	of	key	concern	for	Barclays,	a	comparison	with	one	of	its	main	Canadian	
competitors	would	have	probably	opened	up	some	interesting	avenues	of	enquiry.	From	
having	read	parts	of	the	author’s	PhD	manuscript	I	recall	that	this	was	her	original	
intention,	but	that	she	could	not	get	access	to	the	archives.		
Nevertheless	Kathleen	Monteith	could	have	added	greater	international	context	by	not	
just	focusing	on	banking	but	on	business	in	colonial	and	recently	independent	areas	such	
as	Latin	America,	Asia	or	Africa.	Indeed	many	of	the	trends,	problems	and	strategic	
choices	Barclays	made	in	the	West	Indies	were	mirrored	in	West	Africa,	and	presumably	
in	other	territories.	Moreover,	as	one	of	her	stated	research	objectives	is	to	investigate	
how	the	bank	dealt	with	the	socio‐political	developments	of	decolonisation	after	1940,	it	
is	somewhat	surprising	that	she	does	not	comment	on	the	research	controversies	in	
business	and	imperial	history	for	Asia	and	Africa,	as	well	as	Latin	America	(see	for	
example	Nicholas	White	in	Economic	History	Review	[Autumn	2000]).	Thus	if	the	focus	of	
her	enquiry	is	Barclays	in	the	West	Indies,	her	later	chapters	on	the	bank’s	strategies	for	
decolonisation	lack	a	framework	that	makes	her	conclusions	accessible	to	researchers	on	
similar	issues	in	different	regions	or	industries.	
Her	earlier	chapters	deal	with	the	formation	of	Barclays	in	1926	and	how	the	bank	dealt	
with	depression	and,	later,	war	conditions.	These	challenges	are	of	a	different	kind	than	
those	after	1940,	and	her	study	does	not	provide	an	overarching	framework	that	
integrates	these	different	time	periods	and	clarifies	to	the	reader	why	they	are	treated	in	
one	volume.	While	1926	makes	sense	as	a	starting	date	because	it	marks	the	merger	of	
the	Colonial	Bank	with	two	other	overseas	banks	to	form	Barclays	Bank	DCO,	the	end	date	
of	1962	marks	the	political	independence	of	the	West	Indies.	Yet	if	the	bank	is	the	primary	
unit	of	analysis,	an	end	date	such	as	1977	when	Barclays	sold	its	assets	to	the	Jamaican	
government	would	have	made	more	sense.	On	this,	Monteith	comments	that	“the	post‐
1962	period	merits	more	detailed	examination	and	analysis	than	can	be	accomplished	
here”	(p.	7).		
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Apparently	the	economic	conditions	in	the	West	Indies	are	the	most	important	organising	
principle,	as	stated	in	the	title	Depression	to	Decolonization,	but	this	is	often	not	clear,	as	
the	focus	of	the	study	is	Barclays.	On	page	3	she	clarified	that	she	is	interested	in	the	
decline	of	the	competitive	advantage	that	British	banks	held	due	to	colonialism	in	that	
period,	although	banks	like	Barclays	remained	profitable	and	reasonably	successful	
despite	this.	She	also	highlights	Barclays’	organisational	evolution	from	trade	finance	
towards	retail	commercial	banking,	which	was	presumably	in	response	to	these	wider	
economic	and	political	conditions.	These	themes	are	not	always	sufficiently	apparent	
within	the	chapters,	and	are	not	really	discussed	in	the	conclusion.		
Her	clearest	statement	of	intention	on	page	9	similarly	highlights	the	problematic	dual	
focus	of	her	study:	“A	detailed	examination	of	the	performance	and	strategies	of	Barclays	
Bank	(DCO)	in	the	West	Indies	should	provide	a	better	understanding	of	the	operations	of	
what	was	one	of	the	world’s	largest	multinational	banks,	and	should	help	dispel	some	of	
the	misconceptions	about	the	role	and	operations	of	these	institutions,	particularly	in	a	
colonial	environment.”	
The	chapters	that	form	the	main	part	of	the	book	are	informative	and	well‐researched,	yet	
largely	descriptive	and	focus	on	different	aspects	of	the	bank	at	various	points	in	time	
(profitability,	staffing,	architecture,	development	finance	etc.)	and	it	is	not	always	clear	
why	these	particular	subjects	were	chosen	and	how	they	add	to	the	overall	picture.	The	
conclusion	expands	on	the	reasons	for	Barclays’	success,	among	them	colonialism	(though	
this	presumably	declined	in	importance),	conservative	lending	policies	(without	engaging	
in	detail	with	its	critics),	and	collusion	(though	apparently	the	bank	did	not	always	adhere	
to	industry‐wide	agreements).		
Monteith	argues	that	Barclays’s	success	in	the	West	Indies	is	down	to	its	competitive	
strategy:	a	drive	for	more	deposits,	targeting	of	significant	multinational	companies,	
branch	expansion,	and	upgrading	branch	facilities	to	appeal	for	customers	–	all	of	these	
were	evident	in	other	territories	and	in	other	banks,	and	it	is	hard	to	see	what	was	unique	
about	Barclays’s	approach.	Considering	the	general	focus	on	strategy,	the	omission	of	any	
strategy‐specific	concepts	other	than	cursory	references	to	Michael	Porter	is	surprising.	
For	example	the	bank’s	policy	to	decentralize	(a	trend	evident	in	all	territories	of	the	
former	Colonial	Bank)	in	response	to	political	change	after	1940	seems	potentially	
significant,	yet	is	treated	on	a	par	with	the	many	other	issues	that	arise	over	the	time	
period	of	almost	40	years	that	the	study	covers.	The	same	applies	to	the	issue	whether	
Barclays	contributed	to	the	economic	development	of	the	West	Indies,	which	is	only	
briefly	discussed	in	a	few	paragraphs.	Although	painstakingly	researched,	this	study	
would	have	benefitted	from	an	explicit	statement	of	focus	and	a	stronger	conceptual	
framework.	
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